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ABSTRACT 
 
The Impact of Part-Time Work on Firm Total Factor Productivity: 
Evidence from Italy 
 
In this paper, we explore the impact of part-time work on firm productivity. Using a large 
panel data set of Italian corporations’ balance sheets for the period 2000-2010, we first 
estimate the total factor productivity (TFP) of each firm for each year. We use different 
approaches aimed at solving input simultaneity, including a version of Ackerberg et al.’s 
(2006) control function approach, which accounts for firm fixed effects. We then match the 
TFP estimates with rich information on the firms’ use of part-time work obtained from survey 
data and estimate the impact of part-time work on TFP at the firm level. We find that an 
increase of 1 standard deviation in the part-time share reduces TFP by 2.03%. The results 
suggest that this harmful effect stems from horizontal rather than vertical part-time 
arrangements. We also find that firms declaring that they use part-time work to accommodate 
workers’ requests suffer the most. Moreover, we show that the so-called ‘flexible’ and ‘elastic’ 
clauses are successful in reducing the negative impact associated with part-time work. 
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1. Introduction
Since the mid-1970s, part-time work has become increasingly common, and now it rep-
resents a pervasive feature of work arrangements. According to Eurostat, about one-fifth of
the total employees in Europe were working on a part-time basis in 2010 and about 67% of
European firms had at least one part-time employee in 2008.
In view of the widespread diffusion of part-time work, the question of whether it is
beneficial or not for firm productivity is of great relevance for both managers and policy
makers. Nonetheless, only a limited number of studies have addressed this issue, while the
bulk of the literature on part-time work has focused on the supply side, also in the perspective
of its alleged positive role in increasing female participation in the labor market.
To our knowledge, only three papers have tried to assess empirically the impact of part-
time work on (labor) productivity. Garnero et al. (2014), using a longitudinal matched
employer-employee data set on Belgian private sector firms for the period 1999-2010, find
that part-time workers are relatively more productive than full-time ones and that this effect
is essentially driven by male long part-timers. On the contrary, Specchia and Vandenberghe
(2013), for a similar panel of Belgian firms over the period 2002-2009, find that part-time
workers are relatively less productive with respect to their full-time counterparts. According
to their estimates, an increase of 10 percentage points in the share of total work accomplished
by part-timers lowers the average labor productivity (defined as value added per hour) by
1.3% for short part-timers and 0.7% for long part-timers. Ku¨nn-Nelen et al. (2013), focusing
on the Dutch pharmacy sector for the year 2007, find that part-timers are relatively more
productive than full-timers. A 10% increase in the part-time share is associated with 4.8%
higher labor productivity. Hence, the literature on this topic is inconclusive: only 2 coun-
tries have been examined (Belgium and the Netherlands); using similar panel data for the
same country, Garnero et al. (2014) and Specchia and Vandenberghe (2013) find contrasting
results, while Ku¨nn-Nelen et al. (2013) focus on a very specific sector.
The theoretical literature has highlighted several channels through which part-time work
may affect firms both with respect to the individual productivity of labor, that is, the labor
productivity of part-timers with respect to full-timers, and with respect to the productivity
of the firm as a whole, that is, total factor productivity.
If a non-constant relationship exists between labor productivity and the number of hours
worked, the average labor productivity of part-timers and full-timers will differ (Barzel,
1973). Pierce and Newstrom (1983) argue that part-timers are more productive than full-
timers because part-time work relieves them from the stress associated with longer working
time, while Barzel (1973) suggests that part-timers are less productive than full-timers be-
cause the working day is characterized by start-up costs. Moreover, according to the human
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capital theory, part-timers are less productive than full-timers due to lower incentives to
invest in human capital accumulation.
Besides affecting labor productivity, the use of part-time work may also influence firm
productivity at the establishment level. On the one hand, employing two workers on a part-
time basis rather than one full-time worker leaves room for communication and coordination
costs and, consequently, can reduce firm productivity (Lewis, 2003). On the other hand,
organizational issues may lead part-time work to be beneficial for firm productivity: firms
in which the activities are concentrated in only a few hours per day or firms in which the
operating hours exceed the full-time working week may benefit from part-time work (Owen,
1978).
In this paper, we focus on the impact of part-time work on a firm’s TFP. Our empirical
analysis is based on an Italian firm-level data set - the Employer and Employee Survey (RIL)
- conducted by the Institute for the Development of Workers’ Vocational Training (ISFOL)
in 2005, 2007, and 2010. The RIL data are uniquely rich in terms of information related
to the use of part-time work in the firm, which constitutes the major reason for using this
source in our analysis. The available information to estimate a firm’s TFP is, instead, more
limited; moreover, the RIL has only a short (three-year) panel component. However, firm-
level TFP estimates can be obtained from AIDA, a much larger panel data set distributed
by the Bureau Van Dijk, which contains the official balance sheets of (almost) all private
sector Italian corporations for the period 2000-2010. Fortunately, AIDA can be matched to
the RIL using a firm’s tax number (codice fiscale).
Our empirical analysis is conducted in two steps. In the first step, we recover TFP
estimates from AIDA, taking advantage of its large size (to increase the efficiency of our
estimates) and its longer panel dimension (which allows us to control for firm fixed effects in
the first-stage TFP estimates). We define TFP as the residual of a (log transformed) Cobb-
Douglas production function. We take care of endogeneity issues involving the estimation
of production functions using a modified version of the semiparametric approach developed
by Ackerberg et al. (2006). This method, proposed by Vandenberghe et al. (2013), accounts
for firm-specific fixed effects in the estimation of TFP. Then, using the firm tax number, we
match the TFP estimates obtained from the AIDA data set with the RIL data set. In the
second step of our procedure, we finally analyze the impact of part-time work on TFP for
the matched RIL firms.
The main result is that part-time work is detrimental to firm productivity: a 1 standard
deviation increase in the part-time share (0.14) is estimated to decrease TFP by 2.03%.
Differently from Garnero et al. (2014), Specchia and Vandenberghe (2013) and Ku¨nn-Nelen
et al. (2013), who interpret their findings in terms of labor productivity differentials be-
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tween part-timers and full-timers, we interpret our results in terms of the communication,
coordination, and transaction costs that part-time work imposes on the firm, consequently
lowering its general efficiency. According to this interpretation, the effect of part-time work
concerns organizational efficiency, as captured by the firm’s TFP.
Thanks to the rich information on part-time work provided by the RIL data set, we
are also able to investigate some of its dimensions, which, at least to our knowledge, have
not been explored previously. In particular, we are able to distinguish between three types
of part-time work: horizontal, vertical, and mixed. Horizontal part-time work, the most
common kind, involves a reduction of the daily working time (e.g. working 5 hours per
working day, instead of 8 hours per day as full-timers generally do). Vertical part-time work,
on the contrary, involves a reduction of the number of working days with respect to full-timers
(e.g. working 8 hours per day, but only on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday), while mixed
part-time work combines horizontal and vertical characteristics. Our findings show that the
negative effect of part-time work is exerted by the horizontal (and mixed) part-time work,
whereas vertical part-time work is found to have virtually no effect on firm productivity.
This result is consistent with the presence of daily communication and coordination costs.
Moreover, we have information on whether part-time work is adopted to accommodate
workers’ requests for a part-time contract or, alternatively, because it satisfies firms’ needs
(e.g. because it is believed that part-time work better suits the production process). Our
results show that part-time work has a stronger (negative) impact when the firm uses it to
accommodate workers’ requests.
Finally, information is available on whether the firm uses part-time work jointly with
so-called ‘flexible’ (for horizontal part-time) and/or ‘elastic’ (for vertical part-time) clauses,
instruments intended to increase the flexibility in the use of part-time work for the employer.
We find evidence that these clauses make part-time work less harmful, suggesting that they
may represent a good compromise between firms’ and workers’ needs and may eventually
lead more firms to hire workers who ask for contracts on a part-time basis.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we undertake a literature
review; in Section 3, we discuss the empirical model and the identification strategy; Section
4 provides a description of the Italian situation; Section 5 describes the data sets used in the
analysis; Section 6 presents and discusses our results; and Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature Review
The academic literature on part-time work has traditionally been concerned with the
supply side of the market. Using individual-level data, it has focused on investigating issues
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such as the determinants of part-time labor supply, its role in granting individuals (especially
women) a satisfactory work-life balance or the part-time versus full-time wage gap.1
When dealing with the demand side, both the theoretical and the empirical literature on
part-time work have been more concerned with the determinants of firms’ use of part-time
work than with its role in affecting firm productivity (see Montgomery, 1988).
Nonetheless, the theoretical literature has proposed several theories on how the use of
part-time work can affect productivity. In general, it is possible to distinguish among two
macro categories: theories that concentrate on the impact of part-time work on the individual
productivity of labor and theories that emphasize the impact of part-time work on firms’
organizational efficiency.
The work by Barzel (1973) represents the starting point of the first set of theories.
Whether part-timers are more or less productive than full-timers in the hours that they work
depends on the relationship between the labor productivity and the number of hours worked
during the day. If the labor productivity is constant across the hours of work, part-timers and
full-timers have the same level of average labor productivity. When this constant relationship
breaks down, there is room for productivity differentials between them. Depending on the
nature of such a relationship (e.g. a positive sloped curve or an inverted U-shaped curve),
part-timers may be more or less productive than full-timers. Barzel (1973), emphasizing the
presence of start-up costs, according to which labor productivity is lower during the first
hours of work and picks up only slowly during the day, argues that part-time workers have
lower average productivity than their full-time colleagues, essentially because part-timers
stop working before full-timers. On the contrary, if one is willing to believe that labor
productivity increases during the working day up to a certain point, after which it starts
decreasing, it turns out that the average labor productivity of full-timers may be lower than
that of part-timers. This is the point made by Brewster et al. (1994), who argue that long
working hours, causing stress and tiredness, can make full-timers less productive than part-
timers. Resorting to the human capital theory initiated by Becker (2009), another strand
of the literature suggests that part-timers have fewer incentives to invest in (firm-specific)
human capital. This lack of incentives, coupled with the fact that part-timers are in general
less committed to career goals than their full-time colleagues (Martin and Sinclair, 2007),
makes them less involved in training activities and eventually results in lower productivity
levels (Nelen and De Grip, 2009).
1See, for example: Blank (1979), for an assessment of the role of part-time work in labor market transitions
of women; Ermisch and Wright (1993), for a discussion on part-time versus full-time wage gaps of British
women and on the determinants of their decision to work part-time; Gregory and Connolly (2008), for an
assessment of the role of part-time work in granting work-life balance for women.
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The second set of theories emphasizes the role of part-time work in affecting the produc-
tivity of the firm as a whole, rather than the individual labor productivity. Several channels
for this effect are proposed, which lead to contrasting results. On the one hand, Lewis (2003)
argues that part-time work may give rise to coordination costs, which eventually decrease
the productivity of the firm. While the potential for these costs is lower in jobs in which
workers can be easily substituted for each other (e.g. along the assembly line), it could be
relevant to jobs in which task-specific skills matter (e.g. clerical work). In this case, part-
time work may also create information inefficiencies and communication costs. On the other
hand, papers related to the demand for part-time labor (e.g. Owen, 1978) have emphasized
the allocation efficiency that part-time work may produce. In particular, firms experiencing
workload peaks during certain hours or days and firms in which the operating hours exceed
the full-time working hours may benefit from part-time work. Since these conditions are
likely to be found in the service industry (and, especially, in the retail industry), most of the
potential benefits of part-time work are to be expected for those kinds of firms. Owen (1978)
also suggests that part-time work may represent a valid option when the demand facing the
firm is characterized by fluctuations such that an additional full-time worker may be ‘too
much’, while an additional part-time worker may be ‘good enough’.
In conclusion, whether the overall effect of part-time work on both labor and firm pro-
ductivity is positive or negative is not clear and is presumably the result of the interplay of
many contrasting forces.
The empirical literature on the impact of part-time work on firm productivity is scarce
and the emphasis has been put, with no exceptions, on labor productivity differentials.
A strand of the literature, using individual-level data, investigates labor productivity dif-
ferentials between part-timers and full-timers by considering the differences in hourly wages,
finding contrasting results. For example, Ermisch and Wright (1993), for British women, and
Baffoe-Bonnie (2004), for the USA, find a significant wage differential between part-timers
and full-timers, with part-timers being paid less. However, Hirsch (2005) finds no significant
wage gap in his USA sample, after controlling for individual and job characteristics. It is
worth emphasizing that the existence of any productivity differentials predicated on the ba-
sis of these studies is only valid to the extent that labor productivity is reflected in hourly
wages, an unwarranted assumption in imperfect labor markets.
Using firm-level data, Arvanitis (2005) is the first to assess the relationship between
part-time work and a more direct measure of labor productivity (defined as sales per em-
ployee) through a reduced-form equation relating labor productivity to firm’s characteristics.
Though simply constructing a dummy variable indicating whether the firm uses part-time
work, he finds that part-time labor is negatively related to labor productivity in a sample of
6
Swiss firms.
Besides Arvanitis (2005), three papers assess labor productivity differentials between
part-timers and full-timers through the use of firm-level measures of labor productivity and
in the context of production functions.
On the one hand, Garnero et al. (2014) use a large matched employer-employee data set
for Belgium for the period 1999-2010 with the aim of exploring the relationship between
wage/productivity differentials between part-timers and full-timers, to evaluate whether
there are any employer rents associated with the use of part-time work. Concerning pro-
ductivity differentials, they find that part-time employees are significantly more productive
than their full-time colleagues. In particular, they show that this result is essentially driven
by male long2 part-timers, whereas the other categories, namely female long and short part-
timers and male short part-timers, do not exhibit significantly different labor productivity
with respect to the reference group (i.e. full-time males). Their empirical model is based
on the separate SYSTEM-GMM3 estimation of a labor productivity function (following the
method proposed by Hellerstein et al., 1999) and a wage function at the firm level. The
estimated contributions of different groups of workers (e.g. full-timers versus part-timers)
to average labor productivity and to average wages allow the authors to investigate whether
some of these groups are sources of rents for the employer.
On the other hand, Specchia and Vandenberghe (2013), sticking to the framework pro-
posed by Hellerstein et al. (1999), again for Belgium (though for a different data set from
the one used by Garnero et al., 2014), find that part-timers are in general less productive
than full-timers. In particular, this negative effect is found to be bigger for short part-timers
than for long part-timers.4 According to their most robust estimates, using the procedure
proposed by Vandenberghe et al. (2013), a 10 percentage point increase in the part-time
share causes the average labor productivity to decrease by 1.3% for short part-timers and
by 0.7% for long part-timers. They also find that the coefficient associated with the short
part-timers turns positive in the retail industry, meaning that their relative productivity is
higher than that of their full-time colleagues.
Finally, Ku¨nn-Nelen et al. (2013) focus on a cross-sectional data set for the Dutch phar-
macy sector. Again resorting to the method proposed by Hellerstein et al. (1999), they
find that part-timers are more productive than full-timers. According to their estimates,
2Garnero et al. (2014) define ‘long’ part-timers as those working more than 25 hours per week.
3‘SYSTEM-GMM’ is the usual way in which the literature refers to the estimator proposed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (2000).
4Specchia and Vandenberghe (2013) define ‘short’ part-timers as those whose working time is less than
55% with respect to that of full-timers and ‘long’ part-timers if it is between 55% and 85%.
7
a 10% increase in the part-time share is associated with an increase in the average labor
productivity of 4.8%.
Since the paper by Ku¨nn-Nelen et al. (2013) concentrates on a very particular industry,
our paper ends up being comparable with those of Garnero et al. (2014) and Specchia and
Vandenberghe (2013), who, though analyzing the same country in (almost) the same period,
obtain contrasting results.
3. Empirical Model and Identification
To investigate the relationship between part-time work and firm productivity, we consider
the following production function:
Yit = f(Lit, Kit;Ait) (1)
where output (Yit) is modeled as a function of labor (Lit) and capital (Kit) and Ait is the
total factor productivity. If, on the one hand, we observe (a measure of) output, labor, and
capital, on the other hand, TFP is unobserved. Ideally, TFP should be conceived as that
part of the output that is not explained by the amount of labor and capital used, that is, as
the residual from (1):
Ait = f
−1(Yit, Lit, Kit) (2)
Therefore, even if not directly observed, it can be estimated according to (2). TFP can be
thought of as a black box containing several aspects of the firm, such as its organizational,
logistic and productive efficiency. It is arguably influenced by many factors, ranging from
firm strategies such as R&D investments, exports, and FDIs to the labor policies carried out
by the firm, for example the use of part-time work5, PTit:
Ait = h(PTit, ...) (3)
Although it would be possible to examine the effect of part-time work on TFP by directly
5According to this framework, part-time labor enters the production function through the TFP. Alterna-
tively, one may assume that part-time workers and full time workers enters additively in a labor aggregate,
but with a potentially different labor productivity, as in Hellerstein et al. (1999). Disentangling the effects of
part-time work on TFP vs on labor productivity is difficult. In fact, when the production function is specified
as a Cobb-Douglas and is log-linearized, as in Garnero et al. (2014), Specchia and Vandenberghe (2013) or
Vandenberghe et al. (2013), the effect of (the share of) part-time workers can be alternatively interpreted as
affecting the TFP or labor productivity. More general production functions might in principle allow for the
identification of the two separate effects. However, in the absence of hard data on individual productivity,
as opposed to firm-level productivity, this task is rather demanding and is not currently pursued in the
literature.
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estimating (1), due to data-related motivations that will be illustrated later, we prefer to
proceed in two steps. In the first step, we retrieve the TFP estimates according to (2). In
the second step, we analyze the impact of part-time work on TFP by estimating (3).
In the first step, we assume that the production function in (1) is a log-transformed
Cobb-Douglas function. A relevant issue in the estimation of production functions is the
potential correlation between the inputs and the unobserved TFP. For instance, a firm hit
by a positive productivity shock is likely to increase its use of labor and capital inputs. This
issue, commonly known as the ‘simultaneity problem’, makes OLS estimates inconsistent.
To solve this problem, several solutions have been proposed. If one is willing to assume that
firm productivity is constant over time, fixed-effects (FE) estimation solves it. However,
this assumption is controversial. Therefore, several control function methods have been
developed that allow firm productivity to follow a more flexible (i.e. time-varying) process.
Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) are the first to propose proxying for unobserved productivity
through the firm’s investment demand. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP) instead suggest
using the firm’s demand for intermediate goods as a proxy for productivity. They argue that
it is more suitable than the demand for investments, essentially because it is more reactive to
productivity shocks and hence more able to capture them. To solve a major drawback of the
LP method, related to collinearity issues, Ackerberg et al. (2006) (ACF) propose a modified
version of it, in which all the estimates of the production function parameters are obtained
in the second step of the estimation procedure. Following Vandenberghe et al. (2013), we
adopt a version of the ACF method that explicitly accounts for firm-specific fixed effects
(ACF-FE). We argue that this procedure is more effective than ACF in delivering consistent
estimates because, by removing the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, it increases the
ability of the productivity proxy to capture the unobserved firm-specific productivity level.
Appendix A provides a detailed discussion on the simultaneity problem and the methods
developed to solve it.
In the empirical analysis, we estimate a separate production function for each industry
(as defined by the 2-digit Ateco 2002 classification) to account for the structural differences
(e.g., in the production process or in industrial relation practices) among different sectors.
In total, we estimate 40 different production functions. We perform OLS, FE, LP, ACF, and
ACF-FE estimation.6 All the estimations include year, region, industry, and year interacted
by industry dummies (industry is defined according to the 3-digit Ateco 2002 classification).
Output (Yit) is measured by the value added. Labor (Lit) is measured by the amount of
personnel costs, including the wage bill and some fringe benefits. Even though we have
6OP is unfeasible for us, since we do not have (reliable) data on investments.
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information on the number of employees, we prefer to use the ‘personnel costs’ item, because
it allows us to measure labor input more accurately, since it takes into account, at least to
a certain extent, the difference in working hours between full-timers and part-timers (which
we do not observe) and overcomes the problems stemming from the differences in the quality
of the workforce. Moreover, the differences in the average hours worked by part-time and
full-time workers are accounted for by our estimation of separate production functions by
industry. Capital (Kit) is measured by the amount of tangible fixed assets.
7 Finally, the
intermediate input demand (to be used in the ACF and ACF-FE methods) is measured by
the ‘raw materials’ item on the balance sheet. After estimating the production functions, we
compute the corresponding TFP estimates according to (2). In view of the considerations
made previously, the TFP estimates obtained from the ACF-FE estimation are elected as
our reference measure of firm productivity. A robustness analysis using alternative TFP
measures is conducted in the appendix.
In the second step, we explore the impact of part-time work on TFP. Specifically, we
consider alternative specifications of the following regression model:
TFPit
∧
= a+ θPTit + γVit + δDit + uit (4)
where: PTit is the number of part-timers over the firm’s total number of employees and is our
regressor of interest; Vit is a vector collecting some variables included as controls (e.g. female
share, non-EU workers share and temporary share); Dit is a set of dummy variables aimed
at controlling for productivity differentials over time, industry (at the 3-digit level), time
and industry (i.e. interaction dummies), region and firm size; while uit is simply the error
term of the regression, possibly correlated with part-time work. In particular, one may argue
that some unobservable time-invariant and firm-specific characteristics, such as managerial
ability, besides contributing to determining firm productivity, also influence the share of
part-time work actually used. One may think that more skilled managers, while allowing
firms to reach a higher level of productivity, are also more prone to accommodate workers’
requests for shorter working time. Similarly, one may argue that the use of part-time work
is influenced by productivity shocks. It may be the case, for instance, that in bad times
firms ‘convert’ some of their full-time employees into part-timers to avoid firing them. The
practical relevance of such concerns will be assessed by comparing the simple OLS estimates
with those obtained with fixed-effects and instrumental variable (IV) regressions.
7In particular, capital is computed through a version of the Permanent Inventory Method that applies a
constant depreciation rate (0.065) to tangible fixed assets.
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4. The Italian Case
In all industrialized countries, including Italy, part-time work started to be used increas-
ingly in the middle of the 1970s. As Kalleberg (2000) points out, the main determinants
of its constant growth can be found in the increased uncertainty of the general economic
conditions and in the (consequent) sharpened competition among firms, which eventually
led them to prefer flexible working arrangements, such as part-time and temporary work. At
the same time, national labor laws, often designed to protect standard workers (i.e. full-time
and permanent), contributed to the growth of part-time work, intended as a way for firms
to escape the costs and legal duties associated with these laws. Demographic changes in
the composition of the labor force have played a fundamental role, too: the rises in married
female workers and older workers, attracted by the flexibility characterizing part-time work,
are the two most straightforward examples.
According to Eurostat, 19.2% of European employees worked part-time in 2010. In Italy,
the part-time share was around 15%, a percentage similar to that of Spain and France.
Many studies stress that part-time work acts as an instrument of work-life balance,
allowing people to conciliate work better with their private life needs. Since women are
usually the ones involved in family care and household activities, it is not surprising that
the great majority of part-time jobs are accounted for by women. Similarly to the rest of
Europe, in Italy the incidence of part-time work among employed women was 29% in 2010,
while it was only 5.5% for men.
Data provided by the ISFOL8 show that part-timers are over-represented in young age
groups and that female part-timers are over-represented in the central age category, pre-
sumably because this is the age at which women have children. Although for women the
incidence of part-time work is largest among the low-educated category, the contrary applies
to males. While part-timers are generally segregated into low-skilled jobs, in the trade and
services sectors they are over-represented in high-skilled occupations. Finally, part-timers
are segregated into temporary contracts and into the trade and household services sectors.
According to the OECD, in 2010, about 40% of Italian part-timers declared themselves
to be employed on a part-time basis against their will. Together with this involuntary part-
time employment, a phenomenon exists that can also be referred to as ‘involuntary part-time’
employment to all intents and purposes. Many firms9 use part-time work to accommodate
workers’ requests for shorter working hours and would prefer to employ their part-time
8In particular, we are referring to the ISFOL PLUS 2008, a large survey conducted on about 40,000
Italian men and women.
9According to the 2010 RIL survey, they are about 60% of those using part-time arrangements.
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workers on a full-time basis. The fact that many part-timers would prefer to work full-time
while, at the same time, many firms employing part-timers would prefer to employ them on
a full-time basis, highlights a substantial misalignment between the demand and the supply
of part-time labor, which eventually leads to dissatisfaction among many workers and firms.
In Italy, part-time work received its first, bare regulation only in 1984. Subsequently,
thanks to the implementation of the European Directives concerning part-time work, it has
been regulated more systematically on several occasions: in 2000, in 2003 (with the so-called
‘Biagi’s law’), and in 2007.
The regulation of part-time work is based on the principle of equal treatment between
part-time and full-time workers, both in relation to the hourly pay and annual leave and
in relation to other kinds of non-monetary benefits. According to the Italian legislation,
the reduction of working hours can occur in three ways: the horizontal model, in which the
employee works all the working days with a reduction in the daily working time; the vertical
model, in which the employee works full-time, but only on some days of the week, month,
or year; and the mixed model, which is a combination of the horizontal and the vertical
part-time model. Part-time work contracts must contain a clear and precise determination
of the working time with respect to the day, week, month and year. Working time can be
made flexible through the use of so-called ‘flexible’ and ‘elastic clauses’. Flexible clauses give
the possibility to modify the collocation of the daily working hours in the case of horizontal
part-time contracts, whereas elastic clauses can be used for extending (and not curtailing)
the number of working hours in vertical part-time contracts. The procedures for the use of
such clauses are provided by the law and by the sectoral labor collective agreements applied
to the specific productive unit.
The general trend in the regulation of part-time work has been, on the one hand, in
the direction of a systematic and structured discipline and, on the other hand, toward the
attainment of greater flexibility and discretion in the signing of part-time work contracts.
Compared with the early regulations, the 2003 Biagi’s Law and, less extensively, the 2007
legislative decree have granted greater flexibility in the working time arrangements and
have reduced the restrictions on carrying out additional/overtime work and on stipulating
flexible or elastic clauses. Moreover, they have left an active role to collective bargaining in
integrating the legal regulation and concretely ruling part-time work. However, as we shall
see later in the discussion, the legislative decree in 2007, though in general oriented toward
increasing part-time work flexibility, significantly reduced firms’ prerogative with respect to
the signing of the elastic and flexible clauses introduced by Biagi’s Law.
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5. Data
To assess the impact of part-time work on TFP, we use the three available waves of the
RIL survey, for 2005, 2007, and 2010. Each wave of the survey interviews over 23,000 private
sector Italian firms, including both partnerships and corporations. Only a sub-sample of the
included firms is followed over time, making the (complete) RIL data set partially panel. The
data are uniquely rich concerning the composition of the workforce, including the fraction
of part-timers and, among them, of horizontal, vertical, and mixed part-timers. Moreover,
they provide information on the reasons for which the firm uses part-time work and on the
use of flexible and elastic clauses. Finally, the data provide an extensive set of firm-level
controls, including management characteristics and the age and education distribution of the
workforce.
In the empirical analysis, we restrict our attention to firms with at least 10 employees.
The rationale behind this restriction is twofold. First, since we are interested in the effect
of part-time work on the organizational efficiency of firms, it is reasonable to consider firms
with a minimal organizational structure. Second, the restriction is required to compute
meaningfully the shares of employees in different work arrangements.
While the RIL data set provides accurate information on employees, the data on revenues,
physical capital, and intermediate inputs are incomplete or completely absent. Hence, to
obtain estimates of a firm’s TFP, we have to resort to another data set. For this purpose,
we use the AIDA data provided by the Bureau Van Dijk for the period 2000-2010. The
data contain comprehensive information on the official balance sheets of (almost) all the
Italian corporations operating in the private sector, except for the agricultural and financial
industries. The data contain yearly values of such variables as revenues, value added, net
profit, book value of physical capital, total wage bill and raw-materials expenditure, as well
as information on the location of the firm and its industry affiliation (defined according to
the Ateco 2002 classification). Using the AIDA data set to obtain the TFP estimates offers a
number of advantages. Thanks to its width (about 2.5 million observations), it is still possible
to gain precise estimates while estimating 40 different production functions. Moreover, the
relatively long panel improves the performance of the methods that exploit the within-firm
variation (i.e. all but OLS) to perform better. To minimize attenuation biases related to
measurement error, we carry out an essential cleaning procedure, as is typically performed
in the literature on the estimation of TFP from balance sheet data. Appendix B provides
a detailed description of this procedure and reports some summary statistics of the AIDA
data set.
Through the national tax number (codice fiscale), which uniquely identifies each firm in
both data sets, it is possible to match the TFP estimates recovered from AIDA with the
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RIL’s firms. We will refer to the resulting data set as the ‘RIL-AIDA’ data set. Out of 22,696
firm-year potential matches, 14,889 are actually matched with the TFP estimate from the
AIDA data set, resulting in a merge rate of about 66%. This result should be considered in
view of the following facts. On the one hand, AIDA does not contain data for agricultural
and financial firms, while RIL does. On the other hand, besides the basic cleaning procedure
described in Appendix B, we are forced to remove from AIDA any observations with missing,
negative, or zero values of the variables used in the production function. Moreover, to
perform all the semiparametric methods described before, we need to restrict the attention
to the AIDA firms with at least two consecutive years of observations.10 Finally, we cannot
exclude coding errors in the reported tax number from either data set, errors that we expect
to be random.
The final version of the RIL-AIDA data set used in the second step is made up of 13,860
firm-year observations for 9,405 firms.
The top panel of Table 1 shows that the manufacturing sector is by far the largest,
accounting for almost 50% of the observations. The services and trade sectors represent
about 18% of the observations, while the rest of the sample is split between the construction
sector (14.4%) and the transportation and telecommunication industry (8%). The lowest
panel of Table 1 shows that for about 63% of the firms we have only 1 observation: this is
due to the partially-panel nature of the RIL data set. About 26% of the firms are observed
over 2 periods, while about 11% of them are observed over 3 periods.11
Table 2 presents some summary statistics of the RIL-AIDA data set. On average, firms’
revenues are 33 million euros per year, but for 50% of the observations they are lower than
5 million euros. The average number of employees in the firms is 104, but for half of them
(75%) this figure is less than 29 (69), consistently with the Italian industrial structure in
which small- and medium-sized firms represent the great majority of firms. On average, 31%
of employees are female and 6% originate from non-EU countries, while 10.5% are employed
on a temporary basis. About 59% of employees are blue-collar workers, 36% are white-
collar workers, and about 5% fill a managerial position. The great majority of workers in
the average firm have a low or medium level of education, while only 8.8% of them have a
10Indeed, when considering the merge between the corporations with at least 10 employees in the RIL
panel with the original version of the AIDA data set, i.e. without any variable cleanings, the merge rate
increases to 92.5%. Still, the match is not full because we are not able to remove agricultural and financial
firms from the RIL panel (in the RIL data set we observe industry classification with many missing values).
11The limited panel dimension of the RIL data is the main reason why we have not adopted the one-step
ACF-FE procedure in Vandenberghe et al. (2013). Implementing this method would force us to restrict our
analysis to firms with at least two consecutive observations, thus dropping about 75% of observations in
our sample. In the next section we also report estimates of the effect of part-time work on TFP based on
fixed-effects models using the more restricted sample.
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college degree; on average, half of the workforce is aged between 35 and 49 years.12
On average, firms employ 8.4% of their workforce on a part-time basis. Among part-
timers, in the average firm 79% are women, while only 21% are men, in line with the fact
that part-time positions are mainly occupied by women. Horizontal part-time work is by
far the most widespread type of part-time work used by firms: on average, 87% of part-
timers have a horizontal part-time contract, while the corresponding figures for vertical and
mixed part-timers are 7% and 6%, respectively. In particular, female horizontal part-time
employees represent the most common type of part-timers, accounting for about 70% of the
total part-timers in the average firm.
Table 3 shows that part-time work is used by the great majority of firms: about 68% of
them employ at least one worker on a part-time basis. On the contrary, the use of elastic
and/or flexible clauses is not so pervasive: only 37% of firms using part-time work adopt
these clauses. Excluding firms using mixed part-time work, it is possible to notice that
the incidence of clauses varies according to the type of part-time work: 34% of firms using
horizontal part-time work apply flexible clauses, while 39% of firms using vertical part-time
work apply elastic clauses.13 The bottom panel of Table 3 summarizes the answers given by
firms employing some part-timers regarding the main reason for their use of part-time work.
The vast majority of them (68%) declare that they use part-time work to accommodate
workers’ requests for shorter working time.14 The remaining 32% is split between those that
use it willingly (30%) and those that give answers that differ from the proposed alternatives
(2%). Among the firms that declare that they use it willingly, the main reasons concern
the suitability of part-time work for the production process (20.7%) and the impossibility of
employing workers full-time because of budget constraints (4.8%). Only a few firms choose
part-time work because they believe that part-timers are more productive than full-timers
(2.46%) and to face programmed seasonality (2.05%).
Overall, these preliminary descriptive statistics provide hints that firms might not be
particularly keen on offering part-time contracts to their employees. Investigating whether
this is related to any detrimental impact of part-time work on a firm’s TFP is the objective
of the following econometric analysis.
12Data on the education and age distribution of the employees in the firm are available only for 2010.
13Since mixed part-time work is a combination of horizontal and vertical part-time work, both flexible and
elastic clauses can be applied in this type of contract. Whereas, flexible clauses only applies to horizontal
part-time work while elastic clauses only applies to vertical part-time work.
14This happens in all the the macro-industries, i.e. manufacturing, construction, trade, transportation
and communication and services.
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6. Results
6.1. Main Findings
In this section, we explore the impact of part-time work on TFP, focusing on the second-
step equation in (4). We refer the reader to Appendix C for details on the TFP estimates
obtained in the first step.
Table 4 presents the results from 11 different specifications and/or methods to estimate
Equation (4). Recall that, since our preferred estimation method for the first step is ACF-
FE, we use the ACF-FE estimates of TFP as the dependent variable in all the following
second-step estimations.
The first column shows the OLS estimates of Equation (4) which includes only a basic
set of controls: dummies for firm size, year, region, and 3-digit industry, plus year and
industry interactions. According to this initial regression, part-time work has a strongly
significant negative impact on firm productivity: a 1 standard deviation increase (0.141) in
the part-time share reduces the firm productivity by 3.04%.15
However, as we pointed out in Section 4, since part-time workers tend to be segregated
with respect to gender, jobs, and types of contract (i.e. temporary versus permanent), it is
safe to control also for these workforce characteristics. This is carried out in Specification
(2), which adds the shares of females, non-EU workers, temporary workers, and blue- and
white-collar workers to the list of controls already included in Specification (1). According
to this model, part-time work still has a negative and significant impact on TFP, though it
is smaller: a 1 standard deviation increase in its share brings about a reduction in the firm
productivity of about 2.03%. The results suggest that, besides being (in general) positively
correlated with the part-time share, these workforce characteristics are negatively related to
TFP.16 Thus, if we fail to control for them, we tend to overestimate the negative impact of
part-time work on TFP.
Moreover, the available empirical evidence suggests that part-timers might also be seg-
regated by age and education. Even though we are not able to account for the age and
education distribution of the workforce for the whole sample period, we can do so for the
year 2010 (Specification (3)). As discussed in Section 3, the characteristics of the manage-
ment may also influence both the level of part-time work and the TFP. Albeit only for the
15Recall that par-time share is measured as the number of part-time employees over the total number of
employees. For an average firm that employs 100 workers, one standard deviation increase in the part-time
share corresponds to an increase in the number of part-timers from 8 to 22.
16In the sample, the shares of females, white-collars, non-EU workers and temporary workers are positively
correlated with the share of part-timers, while its correlation with the share of blue-collars is negative but
very small (-0.006).
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year 2010, we are able to account for several managerial characteristics: the manager’s type
(i.e. whether he or she is the owner of the firm or an internal/external manager), gender,
education, and age (Specification (4)). Comparing Specification (5), which reproduces Spec-
ification (2) but only for the year 2010, with Specifications (3) and (4), we can see that these
sets of controls do not substantially change the estimate: -0.182 in both (3) and (4) versus
-0.192 in (5).
Despite our specifications already control for a rich list of potential confounding factors,
one may still be concerned that unobservable firm heterogeneity (e.g. managerial ability)
might preclude the identification of the causal effect of interest. One way to investigate
whether this is the case is to compare our previous findings with those obtained from a
FE estimation of Equation (4), thereby removing the omitted variable biases arising from
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. According to the FE Specification (6), which only
includes year and year/industry interaction terms, the effect of part-time work on TFP is
still negative and significant at the 10% level. The FE Specification (7) adds the usual
workforce controls, specifically, the shares of females, non-EU workers, temporary workers,
and blue- and white-collar workers. The estimated coefficient is very similar to the first FE
specification (-0.115 versus -0.117) and still significant at the 10% level. For comparative
purposes, Specification (8) performs an OLS regression as in (2) but on the sample used in
the FE estimation. The estimated impact of part-time work is still negative and significant,
albeit a little higher in absolute terms than the FE one (-0.169 versus -0.117). When assessing
these results, it should be noted that FE estimates are known for delivering coefficients biased
toward 0, because of the exacerbation of the measurement error induced by the within-firm
transformation. Regarding the higher p-value of the part-time coefficient in the FE than
in the OLS estimates, it should be noted that the FE method can only be performed on a
much smaller sample and with limited within-firm variation due to the short longitudinal
dimension of the RIL data.
As discussed in Section 3, an additional concern is that part-time work might be correlated
with idiosyncratic productivity shocks to the firm, causing part-time work to be endogenous
and hindering the identification of the causal effect of interest. To explore this possibility, we
perform a simple IV estimation of Equation (4), in which we instrument part-time work with
its 2- or 3-year lag. In practice, in the equation for the year 2010, we instrument the part-
time share with its level in 2007, and in the equation for the year 2007, with its level in 2005.
Notice that to perform this kind of IV estimation, we lose one year of observations, that is,
2005, and we are forced to consider firms with at least 2 years of consecutive observations.
This sharply reduces our sample to only 3,536 observations. The results of this IV estimation
are presented in column (9) of Table 4. The estimated impact of part-time work on TFP is
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still negative, significant at the 1% level and equal to -0.273.17
Since this model is exactly identified, we cannot assess the validity (i.e. the exogeneity) of
the instrument used. To gain insights into this issue, we perform another IV estimation that,
besides instrumenting part-time work with its own lag, adds other instruments constructed
on the basis of the method proposed by Lewbel (2012). This approach serves to identify
parameters in models with endogenous regressors, when external or internal instruments are
lacking, or, alternatively, to gain overidentification for testing the validity of the orthogonality
conditions. Identification is achieved by having instruments that are uncorrelated with the
product of heteroskedastic errors. In practice, the first step is to run an OLS regression on
the endogenous regressor (part-time share, in our case) against all the exogenous regressors
in the model. Then the residuals obtained from this regression are used to construct the
instruments from:
Zj = (Xj − X¯) ·  (5)
where  is the vector of the first-stage residuals, Xj is the vector of observations for the
exogenous regressor j, X¯ is its mean, and Zj is the instrument generated from regressor Xj.
Besides the lag of part-time work, we use 5 additional instruments constructed on the basis
of Equation (5) from the shares of females, non-EU workers, temporary workers, and blue-
and white-collar workers. With these 6 instruments for the part-time share, we can then
perform the standard IV estimation (Specification (10)). The estimated coefficient is again
negative, significant at the 1% level and equal to -0.252. The Hansen-J test for the validity
of the overidentifying restrictions indicates that they are valid overall (p-value 0.806). As
before, for comparative purposes, we run an OLS regression on the sample used in the IV
estimation (Specification (11)), finding similar estimates (-0.195) for the coefficient of part-
time work. Comparing the two sets of estimates, we conclude that the potential correlation
of part-time work with time-varying productivity shocks is unlikely to represent a major
issue for our results in practice.
Before considering a number of robustness checks and extensions, we briefly discuss the
association between TFP and the other regressors included in the analysis. Increases in
the shares of females, non-EU workers, and blue- and white-collar workers (with respect to
managers) are generally associated with a decrease in TFP. On the contrary, the share of
temporary, young (under 35), and highly educated workers is positively correlated with TFP.
Our results also suggest that having an internal/external manager is more beneficial to a
firm’s TFP than when the owner of the firm also manages it. A negative association is also
17Lagged part-time share is a strong predictor of current part-time share, with a first-stage F statistic well
above conventional threshold levels.
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detected between TFP and female managers, as is the case of young managers (under 40).
The results also suggest that TFP increases with the firm size.
Appendix D provides some robustness checks. First, we compare the estimated impact
of part-time work on TFP when different TFP estimates are used. Second, we consider the
impact of interest only for the period before the crisis (i.e. the years 2005 and 2007). Our
main results remain broadly unchanged.
To summarize, we find that part-time work has a negative impact on firm productivity.
Our estimates are in line with those reported by Specchia and Vandenberghe (2013) for
Belgium. In particular, while they find that a 10 percentage point increase in the part-time
share causes firm productivity to decrease by 1.3% (0.7%) for long (short) part-timers, we
find the same figure to be slightly higher: 1.45%.18
We also find that not accounting for the age and education distribution of the workforce
and management characteristics, on the one hand, as well as unobserved firm-specific fixed
effects and the correlation of part-time work with productivity shocks, on the other hand,
is unlikely to represent a real threat to the identification of the effect of interest. In view
of this consideration and given that OLS estimation allows us to exploit the full sample,
we take Specification (2) as our reference, both for assessing the effect of part-time work on
productivity, as just discussed, and for our extensions, which are discussed below.
6.2. Extensions
Until now, we have found that part-time work is generally detrimental to firm produc-
tivity. This finding is coherent with the idea that part-time work causes information, com-
munication, and organizational inefficiencies, which eventually translate into productivity
losses.
We now concentrate on some extensions, which, at least to our knowledge, have never
previously been explored.
Table 5 shows the OLS estimates of the separate impacts of horizontal, vertical, and
mixed part-time work. Not surprisingly, since it represents most of the part-time work,
horizontal part-time work is estimated to have virtually the same impact on TFP as already
shown for the general case (-0.148 versus -0.146). This result is strongly significant (at the
1% level). Vertical part-time work is also estimated to have a negative impact, though it is
very small in magnitude (-0.013) and not significantly different from zero at any conventional
level. This result suggests that what really threatens the organizational efficiency of the firm
is working shorter hours each day, while working full-time on only some days of the week
18We cannot distinguish between long and short part-timers.
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(or month) does not seem to do so. Mixed part-time work is predicted to have a negative
and significant impact on TFP (-0.197): being a mixture of the horizontal and the vertical
model, it is presumable that its effect stems from the horizontal component.
In Table 6, we analyze whether the impact of part-time work on TFP is different if the
firm passively accepts it as a consequence of workers’ requests for shorter hours with respect
to the case in which the firm willingly chooses to use it. To answer this question, we divide
the sample of firm-year observations using part-time work into two sub-samples: those using
part-time work as the result of workers’ requests and those that choose to adopt it.19 The
results are consistent with our conjecture: the firms that are ‘forced’ to use part-time work
are the ones that suffer the most from it. Indeed, a 10 percentage point increase in the part-
time share is estimated to reduce TFP by about 2.5% in this case. On the other hand, the
reduction in TFP is only 1.3% for the case in which firms willingly choose to use part-time
work. What is surprising is that part-time work is also harmful to those firms that willingly
choose to adopt it.20 One possible reason for this might be that managers fail to anticipate
fully the detrimental impact of part-time work on productivity. However, it may also be
the result of a consciously weighed trade-off between productivity losses and costs savings if
part-timers are discriminated against in terms of hourly pay.
Table 7 investigates whether the impact of part-time work on productivity is different if
the firm utilizes elastic and/or flexible clauses. As before, we split the sample of firm-year
observations using part-time work into two groups: those that use part-time contracts with
clauses and those that do not. We find evidence that using such clauses helps in cushioning
the negative effect of part-time work. They contribute to reducing its negative impact by
about 43%. In particular, a 10 percentage point increase in the part-time share is estimated
to bring about a decrease in TFP by 1.07% in the case in which the clauses are used, whereas
the same increase causes TFP to decrease by about 1.89% in the case in which they are not
used. These results shed light on the role of these clauses as instruments intended to increase
the flexibility for the firms in the use of part-time work and, hence, to make them more willing
to use it, while allowing individuals to conciliate better their work and private life.
To gain further insights into the potential for clauses to reduce the productivity losses
associated with part-time work, the lowest part of Table 7 presents the results of the separate
estimation for the 2005 and 2007 waves (i.e. before the part-time reform of 200721) and for
19Notice that we have to remove observations that use part-time work but choose the ‘other reason’ item,
since we do not know whether they belong to the first or to the second group.
20Even removing from the sample firms declaring to use part-time work because they cannot afford to keep
the workers on a full-time basis, which in a sense makes them forced to use it, does not change the result.
21Since this reform has been enacted on December 24th, it has virtually started to be applied since 2008.
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the 2010 wave (i.e. after the reform). Indeed, if the 2003 Biagi’s Law was in the direction of
great freedom in the use of clauses by firms, thus favoring them at the expenses of employees,
with the subsequent law in 2007, the situation shifted in favor of employees. Since then, the
precise procedure for using elastic and flexible clauses has had to be agreed on the basis of
sectoral collective agreements, into which the needs of individual firms cannot be directly
incorporated.22 The results suggest that when Biagi’s Law was in force (2005 and 2007),
using part-time work with clauses decreased TFP by about 47% less than using it without
clauses, whereas using part-time work with clauses in 2010, when the power of firms in
relation to the use of clauses was strongly reduced as a result of the 2007 Law, is estimated
to have decreased TFP by about 37% less with respect to the case in which clauses were
not used. These estimates suggest that the capability of clauses to curtail the productivity
inefficiencies caused by part-time work has been substantially reduced as a result of the 2007
Law, by as much as 10 percentage points. This eventually contributes to making firms less
willing to grant part-time work to employees who ask for it. An implication of these findings
is that introducing more flexibility into the use of part-time work could be a win-win strategy:
for firms, which would experience a smaller loss in productivity associated with part-time
work, and for workers, since firms would be more willing to offer part-time contracts to those
workers who wish to have one.
Finally, Table 8 summarizes the results for the separate impacts of part-time work on TFP
by sector of economic activity. We find that part-time work is harmful to firm productivity
in all the macro-categories of industries: manufacturing, construction, trade, transportation
and communication, and services. The impact of interest is always statistically significant
(at least at the 10% level) and ranges between -0.122 (for manufacturing) and -0.467 (for
transportation and communication). When we drill down and consider several sub-industries,
we find that only for the retail sector does the impact of part-time work on TFP change its
sign, becoming positive, though very small in magnitude (0.006). This result is consistent
with the observation that retail shops often have longer opening hours than the typical
full-time working time and that they may also experience workload peaks during the day.
Under these circumstances, part-time work may have the potential to increase the allocation
efficiency, as argued by Ku¨nn-Nelen et al. (2013), who report a positive effect for the Dutch
pharmacy sector (which belongs to the retail sector). The impact of part-time work also turns
positive for the retail sector in the study by Specchia and Vandenberghe (2013). However,
notice that this positive effect is never statistically significant at any conventional level in
22The Biagi’s Law allowed the employers and the employees to directly stipulate flexible and elastic clauses,
even in the absence of collective agreements. Starting from 2007, this is no more permitted.
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our case.23
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the impact of part-time work on firm TFP through a two-step
procedure. In the first step, we use a large panel data set on (almost) all Italian corporations
for the period 2000-2010 to obtain a TFP estimate for each firm-year observation. We deal
with the simultaneity issue concerning the estimation of production functions through the
ACF-FE method, which explicitly takes unobserved firm heterogeneity into account. We
then match the TFP estimates with a uniquely rich survey on Italian firms for the years
2005, 2007, and 2010. In the second step of the procedure, we explore the impact of part-
time work on TFP.
Our main finding is that part-time work is detrimental to firm productivity: a 1 standard
deviation increase in the part-time share is estimated to decrease TFP by about 2%. Our
emphasis for this result is on the communication and coordination inefficiencies created by
part-time work, eventually leading to a decrease in productivity.
We also explore the separate impacts of horizontal, vertical, and mixed part-time work,
finding that the negative impact of part-time work is mostly exerted by the horizontal com-
ponent, while for the vertical model we find no significant impact. This suggests that what
really damages a firm’s organizational efficiency is the daily reduction in the working time.
These findings have broad policy implications. For example, more men could be encouraged
to take on vertical part-time work (e.g. working four full-time days per week instead of
five) with little disruption for firms and for their own careers and to the advantage of their
wives/partners’ participation in the labor market and the promotion of gender equality.
Moreover, we find that the firms that are ‘forced’ to use part-time work to accommodate
the requests of their workers are the ones that suffer the most from it: the negative impact
of part-time work on those firms is almost double with respect to that on firms that adopt it
willingly. While this difference is consistent with the expectations, one reason for part-time
also being harmful to firms that deliberately choose it may reside in the inability of managers
to anticipate correctly the coordination and communication costs related to part-time work.
It may also be the result of a consciously weighed trade-off between productivity losses
and cost savings in the presence of pay discrimination against part-timers, as suggested
by Garnero et al. (2014). More empirical evidence on these issues is needed, offering a
potentially fruitful area of exploration for future research.
23We only have 346 observations for the retail sector.
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Finally, we find that flexible and elastic clauses are effective in reducing the productivity
losses associated with part-time work: the use of such clauses is estimated to decrease the
negative impact by about 43%. Considering that a large fraction of firms declare that they
use part-time arrangements in response to their employees’ requests, these clauses appear
to provide an important instrument to increase firms’ flexibility in the stodgy usage of
part-time work. In this view, flexible and elastic clauses may represent a win-win policy:
reducing the negative impact of part-time work on productivity, they render firms more
prone to concede part-time arrangements to workers who ask for them. Policy makers should
consider encouraging a wider use of such practices in countries and sectors where they are
not available, as well as promoting a greater degree of flexibility in the existing schemes.
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Table 1: RIL-AIDA data set: distribution of observations by industry and number
of observations
Industry Frequence Percentage
Manufacturing 6,897 49.76
Construction 2,002 14.44
Trade 1,46 10.58
Transportation and communication 1,111 8.02
Services 2,383 17.19
Total 13,860 100
Number of observations Firms Observations
1 5,967 5,967
2 2,421 4,842
3 1,017 3,051
Total 9,405 13,860
Source: RIL-AIDA data set (years: 2005, 2007 and 2010)
Table 2: RIL-AIDA data set: sample summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1st Q. Median 3rd Q.
Information from AIDA data set
Revenues 33,123,111 207,185,847 2,072,153 4,984,099 15,364,193
Value added 7,611,426 33,644,799 680,148 1,445,422 4,015,138
Personnel costs 4,596,118 18,639,319 483,370 1,001,541 2,604,675
Wages 3,179,241 12,991,786 340,868 700,014 1,823,686
Capital* 6,067,997 41,796,696 163,482 663,540 2,615,590
Raw materials 17,784,712 146,538,303 444,044 1,539,676 6,046,541
Profit 795,510 16,413,536 152 32,194 214,378
Information from RIL data set
Employees 103.709 396.895 15 29 69
Female share 0.306 0.245 0.105 0.233 0.462
Non-EU share 0.058 0.110 0 0 0.068
Temporary share 0.105 0.153 0 0.055 0.140
Blue-collars share 0.593 0.299 0.400 0.692 0.822
White-collars share 0.361 0.279 0.152 0.268 0.533
Managers share 0.046 0.078 0 0.009 0.066
College share** 0.088 0.139 0 0.042 0.101
High-school share** 0.418 0.253 0.214 0.370 0.600
Middle-school share** 0.495 0.297 0.24 0.545 0.750
Under-25 share** 0.056 0.087 0 0.020 0.083
25-34 share** 0.244 0.179 0.118 0.208 0.333
35-49 share** 0.510 0.192 0.400 0.514 0.629
Over-50 share** 0.189 0.148 0.081 0.167 0.273
Information from RIL data set: part-time work
Part-time share 0.084 0.141 0 0.040 0.098
Female part-time share 0.065 0.115 0 0.026 0.081
Male part-time share 0.019 0.058 0 0 0.009
Horizontal part-time share 0.070 0.126 0 0.029 0.083
Vertical part-time share 0.006 0.035 0 0 0
Mixed part-time share 0.008 0.051 0 0 0
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Table 2: RIL-AIDA data set: sample summary statistics - continued
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1st Q. Median 3rd Q.
Horizontal female part-time share 0.056 0.104 0 0.018 0.071
Vertical female part-time share 0.004 0.026 0 0 0
Mixed female part-time share 0.005 0.039 0 0 0
Horizontal male part-time share 0.015 0.051 0 0 0.002
Vertical male part-time share 0.002 0.016 0 0 0
Mixed male part-time share 0.002 0.022 0 0 0
Female share inside part-time 0.791 0.321 0.667 1 1
Male share inside part-time 0.209 0.321 0 0 0.333
Horizontal part-time share inside part-time 0.868 0.294 1 1 1
Vertical part-time share inside part-time 0.070 0.215 0 0 0
Mixed part-time share inside part-time 0.062 0.214 0 0 0
Horizontal female share inside part-time 0.699 0.375 0.500 0.909 1
Vertical female share inside part-time 0.046 0.172 0 0 0
Mixed female share inside part-time 0.046 0.180 0 0 0
Horizontal male share inside part-time 0.170 0.297 0 0 0
Vertical male share inside part-time 0.024 0.118 0 0 0
Mixed male share inside part-time 0.016 0.100 0 0 0
Number of firm-year observations: 13,860
Number of firms: 9,405
Source: RIL-AIDA data set (years: 2005, 2007 and 2010)
* Computed according to the permanent inventory method. See Appendix B for details.
** Only for the year 2010 (5,912 observations).
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Table 3: RIL-AIDA data set: part-time work; use, types, clauses, and reasons
Frequence Percentage
Use of part-time work and clauses
Yes 9,434 68.07
of which:
with clauses (elastic and/or flexible) 3,467 36.75
without clauses (elastic and/or flexible) 5,967 63.25
Types of part-time work
Horizontal part-time work use 8,710 62.84
Vertical part-time work use 1,407 10.15
Mixed part-time work use 1,061 7.66
Flexible and Elastic Clauses - excluding firms using mixed part-time work
Horizontal part-time work use 8,041 62.83
of which:
with flexible clauses 2,721 33.84
without flexible clauses 5,320 66.16
Vertical part-time work use 1,169 9.13
of which:
with elastic clauses 459 39.26
without elastic clauses 710 60.74
Reasons for the use of part-time work
Workers’ willingness 6,411 67.96
for accommodating workers’ requests for shorter working time 6,411 67.96
Firms’ willingness 2,828 29.98
it is suitable for the production process 1,954 20.71
it is not affordable to employ workers full-time 449 4.76
it increases labor productivity 232 2.46
for facing programmed seasonality 193 2.05
Other reasons 195 2.07
Other reasons 195 2.07
Source: RIL-AIDA data set (years: 2005, 2007 and 2010)
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Table 4: Results; basic model (part-time work); estimation methods: OLS, FE, IV
Dependent variable: T̂ FP it (ACF-FE estimates)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Variable OLS1 OLS2 OLS2010a OLS2010b OLS2010c FE1 FE2 OLS-comp1 IV1 IV2 OLS-comp2
Part-time share -0.219*** -0.146*** -0.182*** -0.182*** -0.192*** -0.115* -0.117* -0.169*** -0.273*** -0.252*** -0.195**
(0.030) (0.031) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.063) (0.066) (0.055) (0.104) (0.095) (0.078)
Female share -0.089*** -0.137*** -0.128*** -0.115*** 0.017 -0.126*** -0.144*** -0.148*** -0.158***
(0.022) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.028) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Non-EU workers share -0.123*** -0.102* -0.080 -0.094 0.008 -0.117*** -0.099 -0.099 -0.100
(0.033) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.046) (0.044) (0.064) (0.064) (0.067)
Temporary share -0.049* -0.027 -0.018 0.026 0.161*** 0.068 0.140** 0.140*** 0.141**
(0.025) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059)
Blue-collars share -0.682*** -0.600*** -0.550*** -0.781*** -0.072 -0.931*** -0.854*** -0.856*** -0.861***
(0.063) (0.106) (0.105) (0.106) (0.068) (0.103) (0.140) (0.140) (0.146)
White-collars share -0.526*** -0.433*** -0.392*** -0.542*** -0.074 -0.772*** -0.554*** -0.556*** -0.563***
(0.065) (0.111) (0.111) (0.114) (0.069) (0.107) (0.149) (0.150) (0.156)
Under-25 share 0.166** 0.184**
(0.0787) (0.079)
25-34 share 0.094** 0.107**
(0.044) (0.044)
35-49 share 0.062 0.073*
(0.044) (0.044)
High-school share 0.011 0.005
(0.026) (0.026)
College-share 0.351*** 0.334***
(0.066) (0.067)
Manager type -0.058***
(0.017)
Manager sex -0.047***
(0.017)
Manager age 0.060***
(0.021)
Manager education 0.003
(0.014)
10-19 Employees -0.920*** -0.895*** -0.908*** -0.878*** -0.919*** -0.802*** -0.802*** -0.802*** -0.802***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.023) (0.031) (0.030) (0.032)
20-49 Employees -0.726*** -0.699*** -0.706*** -0.684*** -0.715*** -0.625*** -0.625*** -0.625*** -0.625***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
50-249 Employees -0.412*** -0.392*** -0.403*** -0.388*** -0.405*** -0.364*** -0.342*** -0.342*** -0.341***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes - - yes yes yes yes yes
Region dummies yes yes yes yes - - yes yes yes yes yes
Year ∗ Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 13,860 13,860 5,216 5,216 5,216 6,989 6,989 6,989 3,536 3,536 3,536
Number of firms 9,405 9,405 5,216 5,216 5,216 3,089 3,089 3,089 2,738 2,738 2,738
Source: RIL-AIDA data set (years: 2005, 2007 and 2010)
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***, **, and * denote, respectively, the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level. The reference group for blue- and white-collar workers’ share
is managers’ share; for the age distribution it is the over-50-years-old share; for education distribution it is the middle-school share; and for the size dummies it is more than 250
employees. The region dummies consist of 20 dummies, 1 for each administrative region in Italy; the industry dummies account for 199 dummies, 1 for each 3-digit Ateco 2002
industry; and the year * industry dummies are the interactions between year and industry dummies, as previously defined. ‘Manager type’ is a dummy that takes the value 0 if the
manager is the owner and 1 if he/she is an internal/external manager; ‘manager sex’ is a dummy that equals 1 if the manager is a female; ‘manager age’ is a dummy that equals
1 if the manager is aged over 40; and ‘manager education’ is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the manager has a college degree or more.
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Table 5: Results; extensions: types of
part-time work; estimation method:
OLS
Dependent variable: T̂FP it (ACF-FE estimates)
Horizontal part-time share -0.148*** (0.033)
Vertical part-time share -0.013 (0.101)
Mixed part-time share -0.197** (0.081)
Number of firm-year observations: 13,860
Number of firms: 9,405
Source: RIL-AIDA data set (years: 2005, 2007 and
2010)
All the estimations include the same set of controls
as in Specification (2) of Table 4. See the footnote
of Table 4.
Table 6: Results; extensions: reasons for the use of part-time
work; estimation method: OLS
Dependent variable: T̂FP it (ACF-FE estimates)
Workers’ requests Firms’ willingness
Part-time share -0.254*** -0.134***
(0.065) (0.050)
Number of firm-year observations 6,411 2,828
Source: RIL-AIDA data set (years: 2005, 2007 and 2010)
The estimates are performed on sub-samples of firm-year observations using part-
time work (9,434). To split the sample on the basis of the reasons for part-time use
(i.e. either workers’ or firm’s willingness), we have to remove those observations
(amounting to 195) for which the item ‘other reasons’ has been chosen, since we do
not know whether they belong to the first or the second group. All the estimations
include the same set of controls as in Specification (2) of Table 4. For the rest, see
the footnote of Table 4.
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Table 7: Results; extensions: flexible and/or elastic clauses; esti-
mation method: OLS
Dependent variable: T̂FP it (ACF-FE estimates)
Flexible and/or elastic clauses No clauses
Part-time share -0.108** -0.191***
(0.051) (0.058)
Number of firm-year observations 3,467 5,967
Only years 2005 and 2007
Part-time share -0.055 -0.103*
(0.078) (0.062)
Number of firm-year observations 2,014 3,123
Only year 2010
Part-time share -0.170** -0.271***
(0.068) (0.089)
Number of firm-year observations 1,453 2,844
Source: RIL-AIDA data set (years: 2005, 2007 and 2010)
The estimates are performed on sub-samples of firm-year observations using part-time
work (9,434). All the estimations include the same set of controls as in Specification (2)
of Table 4. For the rest, see the footnote of Table 4.
Table 8: Results; extensions: industry differentials; estimation method:
OLS
Dependent variable: T̂FP it (ACF-FE estimates)
Industry Part-time share Observations Mean Std. Dev.
Manufacturing -0.122** 6,897 0.062 0.089
(0.050)
Construction -0.228* 2,002 0.049 0.075
(0.118)
Trade -0.215** 1,467 0.106 0.140
(0.091)
of which: Retail 0.006 346 0.173 0.189
(0.141)
Transportation and communication -0.467** 1,111 0.055 0.094
(0.186)
Services -0.203*** 2,383 0.177 0.245
(0.048)
Number of firm-year observations: 13,860
Number of firms: 9,405
Source: RIL-AIDA data set (years: 2005, 2007 and 2010)
All the estimations include the same set of controls used as in Specification (2) of Table 4. For the
rest, see the footnote of Table 4.
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Appendices
A. First step: estimating the TFP
To begin with, we assume that the equation relating output to inputs and TFP is a
production function of the Cobb-Douglas type:
Yit = AitL
βl
itK
βk
it (A.1)
where Ait, TFP, is modeled as:
Ait = exp{α + νt + µj + σr + ωit + it} (A.2)
where α is the average productivity of the firms; νt, µj and σr are respectively time-, industry-
, and region-specific deviations from that mean; and ωit is the time- and firm-specific (i.e.
idiosyncratic) deviation from that mean; whereas it is a measurement error that is by
assumption not correlated with the inputs.
Moreover, we assume that labor and capital are not perfectly flexible inputs. Intuitively,
this means that the amounts of labor and capital to be used in the production process at t
are actually decided by the firm at t − 1. This assumption is consistent with the fact that,
on the one hand, new capital takes time to be ordered, delivered, installed, and put into
operation and that, on the other hand, it takes time to fire and/or hire workers. In the rest
of the discussion, we will refer to this as the ‘timing assumption’.
In practice, the production function that we estimate is obtained by using (A.2) and by
taking logs in (A.1):
yit = α + βllit + βkkit + νt + µj + σr + ωit + it (A.3)
where lowercase letters indicate natural logarithms.
A crucial issue in estimating production functions lies in the simultaneity of inputs. Labor
and capital are likely to be correlated with the productivity of the firm (i.e. with Ait): if the
firm faces a positive productivity shock, it may decide to expand its output by increasing
its usage of labor and/or capital.24 Notice that, since νt, µj and σr are easily accounted
for by inserting time, industry, and region dummies, the real concern is related to ωit which
is unobservable to the econometrician and idiosyncratic to the firm. Hence, the rest of the
discussion focuses on ωit rather than on the whole expression for (the log of) Ait and, for
24We are implicitly assuming that the firm knows (at least partially) its productivity.
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the sake of notation, we write the production function as:
yit = α + βllit + βkkit + ωit + it (A.4)
where yit, lit and kit are from now on the time-, industry-, and region-demeaned output,
labor, and capital.
The simultaneity problem makes OLS estimates of (A.4) and, consequently, of the TFP25,
inconsistent. According to the assumptions that are made concerning the structure of ωit,
several methods can be used to deal with the simultaneity of inputs. Whether one method is
better than another depends on what we consider to be the most realistic set of assumptions
for ωit.
If we are willing to believe that ωit is constant over time (i.e. ωit = ωi), exploiting the
time dimension of our data, we are able to eliminate the simultaneity problem (i.e. of ωi)
by running an OLS regression on the within-group transformation of (A.4):
y˜it = βl l˜it + βkk˜it + ˜it (A.6)
where the tilde operator indicates the within-group transformation: x˜it = xit− 1T
∑T
t=1 xit.
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Since the assumption that ωit is constant over time is rather restrictive, other methods
have been developed that try to solve the simultaneity issue while allowing ωit to evolve over
time according to a more flexible process. In the context of the control function approach,
Olley and Pakes (1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and Ackerberg et al. (2006) are the
most notable examples. Since our preferred specification is based on an extended version of
the method developed by Ackerberg et al. (2006), we concentrate on it here (for a detailed
discussion of the OP and LP methods, see Van Beveren, 2012 and Del Gatto et al., 2011).
In the ACF framework, ωit evolves over time according to a first-order Markov process,
its realization at time t is observed by the firm at time t (i.e. contemporaneously) and it is
at least partially anticipated by the firms. Since ωit is assumed to follow a first-order Markov
process, it is possible to write:
E[ωit|Iit−1] = g(ωit−1) + ξit
25According to (2), the (natural) logarithm of the total factor productivity for firm i at time t is computed
as:
lnAit ≡ TFPit = yit − β̂llit − β̂kkit (A.5)
where β̂l and β̂k are the estimated production function coefficients.
26This procedure is known as fixed-effects (FE) or within-group regression. Notice that in this case µj
and σr are already removed by the within-group transformation, since they are time invariant.
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where Iit−1 is the information set of firm i at time t−1; g(·) is a completely general function
and represents the predictable component of ωit; and ξit is the innovation in the productivity,
which, by construction, is unpredictable by the firm, that is, E[ξit|Iit−1] = 0. Notice that
the assumption that ωit follows a first-order Markov process, relates both to the stochastic
process regulating ωit and to the firms’ information set. Basically, firms observe ωit at t and
form expectations about ωit using g(·) at t− 1.
The intermediate inputs, mit, are assumed to be perfectly flexible: the choice of the
amount of them to be used at t is made at t (i.e. contemporaneously). Moreover, they are
assumed not to have any dynamic implication: mit does not depend on mit−1.27 Moreover,
it is assumed that the demand for intermediate inputs is a function of labor, capital, and
firm productivity and that f is strictly increasing in ωit:
mit = f(lit, kit,
+
ωit) (A.7)
Intuitively, this amounts to requiring that the greater the productivity, the larger the de-
mand for intermediate inputs. If this (strict) monotonicity condition on f holds, it can be
inverted out to deliver an expression of ωit as a function of lit, kit, and mit, which are indeed
observables:
ωit = f
−1(lit, kit,mit) (A.8)
This expression for ωit can then be substituted into (A.4) to produce:
yit = α + βlit + βkit + f
−1(lit, kit,mit) + it (A.9)
At this point, ACF propose a two-step strategy to obtain estimates of βl and βk. In the
first step, yit is non-parametrically regressed against a function in lit, kit, and mit, which we
call Φ(lit, kit,mit).
28 From this regression, we can identify the composite term:
Φ̂it = α + βllit + βkkit + ωit
∧
Given guesses of βl and βk, that is, β
∗
l and β
∗
k , it is then possible to obtain the implied ωit,
27On the contrary, capital and labor are not restricted to be non-dynamic. Adjustment costs in labor and
capital are therefore admitted (e.g. hiring/firing costs and capital disposal costs).
28In our empirical analysis, we approximate Φ(·) with a second-order polynomial in lit, kit and mit. For
robustness, we have also tried with higher orders (third- and forth-order polynomials). However, since this
does not substantially alter the results, we have decided to use the second-order approximation.
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i.e. ωˆit(β
∗
l , β
∗
k)
29, as:
ωˆit(β
∗
l , β
∗
k) = Φ̂it − β∗l lit − β∗kkit
Recalling that ωit is assumed to follow a first-order Markov process, that is, ωit = g(ωit−1) +
ξit, and given our implied ωˆit(β
∗
l , β
∗
k), it is possible to compute implied innovations ξˆit(β
∗
l , β
∗
k , )
as the residuals from a non-parametric regression of implied ωˆit(β
∗
l , β
∗
k) on implied ωˆit−1(β
∗
l , β
∗
k).
30
In the second step of this procedure, the sample analogues of the moment conditions imposed
by our model31 are evaluated:
1
N
1
T
∑
i
∑
t
ξˆit(β
∗
l , β
∗
k)kit = 0
1
N
1
T
∑
i
∑
t
ξˆit(β
∗
l , β
∗
k)lit = 0
(A.10)
The search over β∗l and β
∗
k continues until βˆl and βˆk are found to satisfy (A.10). These are
the ACF estimators of βl and βk.
Though the ACF method offers a potential solution to the simultaneity problem, we argue
that explicitly accounting for a time-invariant component in the structure of firm produc-
tivity, besides the time-varying one, would represent a further enhancement at a relatively
low cost. In a nutshell, ACF propose to proxy firm productivity, which is unobservable,
through the intermediate inputs’ demand. Very powerful though this proxy may be, some of
the firm productivity is still likely to be left unexplained. From this perspective, removing
the time-invariant part of the productivity would definitely increase the chance of the proxy
working well. Following Vandenberghe et al. (2013), we argue that only the first stage of the
ACF procedure needs to be modified to account explicitly for firm fixed effects.
In this framework, the total factor productivity is modeled as:
ωit = ηi + ω
∗
it (A.11)
According to (A.11), the firm productivity is composed of the sum of a time-invariant (ηi)
and a time-varying (ω∗it) component. On the one hand, ηi can be thought of as including
firm features such as the managerial quality, the culture of the firm, and its international
profile, which can be assumed to be fixed over time, whereas the time-varying component ω∗it
can be thought of as an idiosyncratic productivity shock hitting the firm at t. Note that we
29Notice that these implied ω′its also comprise the constant term α.
30In our empirical analysis, we approximate g(·) with a third-order polynomial in ωˆit−1(β∗l , β∗k).
31The moment conditions imposed by our model, stemming from the assumption that capital and labor
are not perfectly flexible inputs, are: E[ξitkit] = 0 and E[ξitlit] = 0.
33
still assume that ω∗it follows a first-order Markov process and that it is partially anticipated
by firms. We then assume that the demand for intermediate inputs is given by:
mit = f(lit, kit, ω
∗
it) (A.12)
so that it solely depends on the amount of labor and capital to be used in t and the produc-
tivity shock observed at t. We exclude the demand of intermediate inputs depending on ηi;
this assumption rules out factors such as management quality, culture, and internationaliza-
tion of the firm contributing to determining the demand for the intermediate goods to be
used in the production process. This does not seem to be an implausible assumption, since
it is reasonable to think that the demand for intermediate inputs, which are by assumption
perfectly flexible and non-dynamic, depends only on time-varying components. Moreover,
we preserve the assumption that f is invertible in ω∗it. This set of assumptions implies that
equation (A.9) is modified as follows:
yit = α + βlit + βkit + ηi + f
−1(lit, kit,mit) + it (A.13)
As before, by setting Φ(lit, kit,mit) ≡ α + βlit + βkit + f−1(lit, kit,mit), we can write (A.13)
as:
yit = Φ(lit, kit,mit) + ηi + it (A.14)
At this point, we are able to remove ηi from (A.14) by applying (non-parametric) FE esti-
mation.32 From the FE estimation of (A.14), we are able to obtain a consistent estimate of
Φ(·), that is, Φˆ(·), so that it is possible to proceed to the (unchanged with respect to the
ACF method) second stage of the estimation from: Φ̂it = α + βllit + βkkit + ω
∗
it
∧
.
32In the empirical analysis, we again approximate Φ(·) with a second-order polynomial in lit, kit, and mit.
Notice that, as in the simple FE case, µj and σr are already removed by the non-parametric FE estimation,
since they are time invariant.
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B. The AIDA data set
The data set used in our analysis is the result of some cleaning with respect to the original
version. We remove firms belonging to the mining industry (there are a few) and to sectors in
which the level of public intervention is substantial, such as the production and distribution
of electricity, gas, and water and garbage disposal. We restrict the attention to firms classified
as ‘active’ and to firms with average revenues greater than 50,000 euros per year. To be able
to estimate the production functions, we are forced to remove observations for which value
added, capital, labor costs, and materials expenditures have missing, negative, or zero values.
Finally, to perform LP, ACF, and ACF-FE estimations, we have to restrict our attention to
firms for which we have at least 2 consecutive years of observations.
The final data set is made up of 2,406,612 firm-year observations for 440,953 firms. While
for 8.08% of the firms we have the complete observation window (11 years), for half of them
we have more than 5 years of observations. Table B.1 shows the distribution of the AIDA data
set across the 40 sectors (2-digit Ateco 2002 classification) for which we estimate a separate
production function. As shown in Table B.1, about one-third of the observations belong to
the manufacturing industry. The trade and services sectors cover respectively about 29% and
21% of the observations, while the remaining observations are split between the construction
industry (14.1%) and the transportation and communication industry (4.18%).
Table B.1: AIDA data set: distribution of observations by sector of economic
activity (2-digit Ateco 2002)
Sector of economic activity Frequence Percentage
Manufacturing 783,129 32.54
Food and beverage 59,613 2.48
Tobacco 146 0.01
Textile 42,434 1.76
Clothing 30,543 1.27
Leather and leather goods 28,837 1.20
Wood and wood products (excluding furniture) 23,615 0.98
Paper and paper product 14,900 0.62
Printing and publishing 37,295 1.55
Coke and petroleum products 2,016 0.08
Chemical products 27,386 1.14
Rubber and plastics 37,835 1.57
Non-ferrous production 44,267 1.84
Ferrous production 15,307 0.64
Ferrous products (excluding machinery) 150,075 6.24
Machinery products 108,722 4.52
Office machinery and computers 6,240 0.26
Electrical machinery 33,566 1.39
Radio, TV and TLC equipment 12,614 0.52
Medical equipment and measurement instruments 22,407 0.93
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Table B.1: AIDA data set: distribution of observations by sector of economic
activity (2-digit Ateco 2002) - continued
Sector of economic activity Frequence Percentage
Motor vehicles 9,942 0.41
Other transportation equipment 10,824 0.45
Furniture and other manufacturing industries 58,161 2.42
Recycling 6,384 0.27
Construction 339,776 14.12
Construction 339,776 14.12
Trade 688,506 28.61
Trade and maintenance of motor vehicles 95,059 3.95
Wholesale (excluding motor vehicles) 373,492 15.52
Retail (excluding motor vehicles) 219,955 9.14
Transportation and communication 100,544 4.18
Land transportation/transportation by pipeline 53,030 2.20
Maritime transportation 1,973 0.08
Air transport 578 0.02
Auxiliary transportation activities 40,775 1.69
Post and telecommunication 4,188 0.17
Services 494,657 20.55
Hotels and restaurants 121,228 5.04
Real estate 67,876 2.82
Rental services 10,723 0.45
Computer and related activities 83,998 3.49
R&D 3,959 0.16
Business services 155,951 6.48
Recreational, cultural, and sport activities 36,411 1.51
Household services 14,511 0.60
Total 2,406,612 100
Source: AIDA data set (period: 2000-2010)
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C. The TFP estimates
Table C.1 shows the correlation matrix of the different TFP estimates, while Table C.2
shows their summary statistics. The different TFP estimates are positively and highly cor-
related: the correlation coefficients range between 0.826 and 0.968 (for a similar finding, see
Van Beveren, 2012). The ACF and ACF-FE estimates are very similar with respect to the
OLS estimates (the correlation coefficients are 0.968 and 0.948, respectively). As expected,
given the high correlations, their summary statistics are quite similar. The mean of the
(natural logarithm of the) TFP estimates ranges between 3.061 for the OLS estimates and
5.506 for the FE estimates. This suggests that the simultaneity issue, though conceptually
relevant, loses part of its importance in practice. Still, the relevance of the simultaneity prob-
lem and, consequently, the empirical validity of the methods trying to deal with it should
be assessed in view of the conclusions that they lead to in analyzing the impact of interest
(see Appendix D, Table D.1).
Table C.1: AIDA data set: correlation matrix of different estimates of TFP (OLS,
FE, LP, ACF, ACF-FE)
TFP estimates OLS FE LP ACF ACF-FE
OLS 1.000
FE 0.857 1.000
LP 0.863 0.845 1.000
ACF 0.968 0.898 0.871 1.000
ACF-FE 0.948 0.928 0.826 0.958 1.000
Number of firm-year observations: 2,406,612
Number of firms: 440,953
Source: AIDA data set (period: 2000-2010)
Table C.2: AIDA data set: summary statistics of different estimates of TFP (OLS,
FE, LP, ACF, ACF-FE)
TFP estimates Mean Std. Dev. 1st Q. Median 3rd Q.
OLS 3.061 1.106 2.229 3.118 3.662
FE 5.506 1.241 4.608 5.435 6.340
LP 5.205 1.176 4.371 5.070 5.934
ACF 3.694 1.143 2.860 3.762 4.358
ACF-FE 3.924 1.356 2.851 4.071 4.741
Number of firm-year observations: 2,406,612
Number of firms: 440,953
Source: AIDA data set (period: 2000-2010)
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D. Robustness checks
As a robustness check, we perform OLS estimation restricting the attention to the pre-
crisis period (i.e. 2005 and 2007). The results confirm that the part-time effect on TFP is
also significantly negative (at the 5% level) for the pre-crisis period and not substantially
different from the general effect (-0.099 versus -0.146).
Table D.1 shows the results for the impact of part-time work on the different sets of TFP
estimates (i.e. OLS, FE, LP, ACF, and ACF-FE). Not surprisingly, considering the generally
high correlations among the different TFP estimates, we find that the predicted impact of
part-time work on TFP is negative, regardless of which first-step estimation method is used.
However, the magnitude of the impact differs somewhat across the methods, ranging between
-0.233, when the LP estimates of TFP are considered, and -0.091, when TFP is estimated
through simple OLS. Interestingly, our reference method (i.e. the ACF-FE) delivers quite
similar estimates of the impact of interest to those stemming from the simple OLS estimation
of TFP. On the contrary, the FE and LP estimations, which are most likely to suffer from
the well-known problem of downward bias for the FE case and collinearity for the LP case,
deliver more different estimates with respect to the ACF-FE method.
Table D.1: Results; robustness checks: OLS, FE, LP, and ACF estimates of TFP
as dependent variables; estimation method: OLS
TFP estimation method OLS FE LP ACF ACF-FE
Part-time share -0.091*** -0.233*** -0.217*** -0.125*** -0.146***
(0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
Absolute difference from ACF-FE estimate 0.055 0.087 0.071 0.022 -
Number of firm-year observations: 13,860
Number of firms: 9,405
Source: RIL-AIDA data set (years: 2005, 2007 and 2010)
The estimation includes the same set of controls as in Specification (2) of Table 4. For the rest, see the
footnote of Table 4.
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